Automobiles—Injuries from Operation or Use of Highway—Nature and Grounds of Liability—Right of Way at Crossing by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 2 
January 1928 
Automobiles—Injuries from Operation or Use of Highway—Nature 
and Grounds of Liability—Right of Way at Crossing 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Automobiles—Injuries from Operation or Use of Highway—Nature and Grounds of Liability—Right of Way 
at Crossing, 13 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 154 (1928). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss2/9 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
ANIi&ALs-WHo CONSTITUTES "KEEPER" bF A DOG ON EXHIBITION AT A SHOW.
-The plaintiff, a patron of an agricultural society, was bitten by a dog on ex-
hibit. At the time the owner held the chain on the dog, and had actual physical
control over it. Held, the society could not be assessed double damages under
statute as "owner or keeper" of the dog. Cruickshank v. Brockton Agricultural
Society, 157 N. E. 357. (Mass., 1927.)
Whether or not a person is the keeper of a dog depends on the peculiar facts
and circumstances of each individual case. Boylan v. Everett, 172 Mass. 453,
52 N. E. 541; Snyder v. Patterson, 461 Pa. 98, 28 Atl. 1006. To be keeper of a
dog, one must harbor the animal, and the word "harbor" in its meaning signi-
fies protection. Hagenan v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 195 N. W. 718. Thus one
who treats a dog as being at his home, and undertakes to control his actions
or allows a child, wife or servant to control his actions is undoubtedly the
"keeper" within the meaning of the statute. Strouse v. Leipf, 101 Ala. 433, 14
So. 667; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Kuckkuck, 197 Ill. 304, 64 N. E. 358; O'Donnell v.
Pollock, 170 Mass. 441, 49 N. E. 745; Jenkinson v. Coggins, 123 Mich. 7, 81
N. W. 974; Hohnes v. Murray, 207 Mo. 413, 105 S. W. 1085; Duval v. Barnaby,
77 N. Y. S. 337; Schaller v. Conners, 57 Wis. 321, 15 N. W. 389.
However, in the case under consideration the owner had possession and physi-
cal control of the animal at the time of the accident. It has been said that to
charge one as the harborer of a dog he did not own, it must appear that he har-
bored it and treated it in the same manner as owners usually treat their own
dogs. Trumble v. Happy, 114 Iowa 624, 87 N. W. 678. Certainly the mere
casual presence of the dog on the defendant's premises could hardly be said to
constitute the defendant the "keeper" under the statute. Fitzgerald v. Brophy,
1 Pa. Co. Ct. 142; Boylan v. Everett, 172 Mass. 453, 52 N. E. 541; McCosker v.
Weatherbee, 100 Me. 25, 59 At. 1019; O'Donnell v. Pollock, 170 Mass, 441, 49
N. E. 745.
The decision in this case is in line with the holding on this point in Buch v.
Wathen, 104 Ky. 548, 47 S. W. 599, in which the facts are the same.
F. A. E., '28.
AUTOmOBILES-INJuRIES FROM OPERATION OR USE OF HIGHWAY-NATURE AND
GROUNDS OF LIABII.iTY-RIGHT OF WAY AT CRosSING.-Plaintiff was driving south
on a highway while defendant was proceeding north on the same road; defend-
ant, while proceeding north, ran into and injured plaintiff's car, which was being
turned left into an intersecting highway. This suit is for damages incident to
that collision. Held, that it is the position of the cars as their paths cross and
not priority in reaching the intersection that determines the application of the
rule prescribed by ordinance here that the driver on the left shall yield the right
of way, and therefore defendant is not liable since he had the right of way.
Boyd v. Close, 257 Pac. 1079 (Colo., 1927).
At old common law before the modem days of the many and speedy horse-
less carriages, the right of way rule now generally prescribed by statute through-
out this country was unknown, and it was generally held that where two per-
sons are approaching each other at a crossing of two streets, their rights are
equal and each is bound to exercise reasonable care to avoid any and all injuries.
Gilbert v. Burque, 72 N. H. 521, 57 A. 927. Of course, with the development of
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modern American life with its "necessity" for speedy transportation, its low
cost of automobile operation, and its consequent traffic congestion with the ever
present possibility, and too often probability, of serious accidents, some definite
codified rule became essential. Such a rule has been settled upon, and the
ordinance, the construction of which is here under consideration, is an example
of such rule. Previously, the main points of dispute have been as to whether
or not the fact that a man has the right of way will excuse what ordinarily
would be actionable negligence, whether relative position only and not distance
from the intersection were to be considered, etc. White v. Pupillo, 263 S. W.
1011 Mo.; Bollinger v. Greenaway, 83 Pa. Sup. Ct. 217; Shirley v. Larkin Co.,
239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751. The present question had not previously
been decided, and it would seem that the right construction is entirely depend-
ent upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute.
Of course, when statutes provide rights of way for those traveling on streets
running in certain directions, in preference to those traveling on streets running
in other directions, as the early statutes did, it is obvious that such statutes re-
quire strict construction; even the majority of the modern statutes, when out-
lining this rule, refer to vehicles traveling on intersecting highways, and under
them it is apparent that the construction given in the instant case would be
faulty. Laws Mo. 1921 (Extra Session), p. 95, section 21, L. Assuming, how-
ever, that the Denver ordinance in question was the same as the Colorado
statute on this subject, this construction might be justified. Comp. Laws of
Colorado (1921), section 1270, provides that a driver shall yield the right of way
at the intersection of their paths to a vehicle approaching from the right at the
same time; a logical construction of such an unusually general statute might
possibly go as far as that of the Colorado court did.
Thus, it can be seen that the construction of this statute by the Colorado
court may be justified in view of the unusual wording of the statute, but it also
seems as if such construction transcends the limits laid down by legislative in-
tent however carelessly such intent was expressed. E. L. W., '28.
COMMERCE-POwER TO REGULATE ADVERTISING IN PEoDIcALs.-Statute pro-
hibiting advertising of cigarettes in any paper, magazine or pamphlet published
within the state of Kansas held unconstitutional as being repugnant to the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitution. Little et at v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237,
257 Pac. 959.
The present action was brought in behalf of the Kansas Press Association who
alleged, in substance, that their publications were interstate in character and the
statute in question limiting the field of advertising was a direct burden on in-
terstate commerce. See State v. Salt Lake Pub. Co., 249 Pac. 474. The con-
tention for its validity was based on a legitimate exercise of the police power.
Prior to the present action the Kansas anti-cigarette statute was repealed and by
the laws of 1927, chapter 121, cigarettes were made fit subjects of barter and
sale subject only to stringent revenue laws; the constitutionality of this statute
was upheld in State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347, 20 A. L. R. 921.
The competency of state legislatures to regulate, and even prohibit, the sale of
cigarettes within their respective states is well settled. Gundling v. Chicago, 177
U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21
Sup. Ct. 132, 45 L. Ed. 255. Iowa, Nebraska, and possibly New York, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin are in accord. The nature of cigarettes as articles of commerce
clothed with federal protection has long presented a mooted situation. It was
held in Blaufield v. State, 103 Tenn. 593, 53 S. W. 1090, that cigarettes were not
legitimate articles of commerce and that a sale in an original package would not
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss2/9
